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No MORE VIETNAMS?: THE WAR AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN 
FOREIGN Poucv. Edited by Richard M. Pfeffer. New York: Harper 
& Row. 1968. Pp. x, 299. $5.95. 
THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LA.w. Sponsored by 
the American Society of International Law. Edited by Richard A. 
Falk. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1968. Pp. ix, 633. 
Cloth, $15; Paper, $3.95. 
THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF WoRLD POWER. By Gale W. McGee. 
Washington, D.C.: The National Press. 1968. Pp. ix, 274. $6.95. 
BEYOND VIETNAM: THE UNITED STATES AND AsIA. By Edwin 
0. Reischauer. New York: Knopf. 1967. Pp. 242. Cloth, $4.95; Paper, 
$1.65. 
A review of the current Vietnam literature1 indicates a striking 
lack of agreement about the pertinent facts of the conflict. There 
are a variety of divergent views, for example, on the nature and 
1, For a selected bibliography, see THE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF DEMOCRATIC !N-
srrrUTIONs, VIETNAM: MATTERS FOR THE AGENDA 62-64 (Center Occasional Paper No. 4, 
June 1968); D. DUNCANSON, GOVERNMENT AND REVOLUTION IN VIETNAM 421-32 (1968); 
G. Kl.HIN 8: J. LEwxs, THE UNITED STATES IN VIETNAM 446-54 (l!l67). THE VIETNAM WAR 
AND INTERNATIONAL I.Aw (R. Falk ed. 1968) contains representative writing on the inter-
national law aspects of the conflict. In addition, see R. BARNET, INTERVENTION AND REV-
OLUTION: THE UNITED STATES IN THE THIRD WORLD (1968); W. BURCHETT, VIETNAM 
WILL WIN (1969); N. CHOMSKY, AMERICAN POWER AND THE NEW MANDARINS (1969); R. 
CRITCHFIELD, THE LONG CHARADE (1968); V. GIAP, BIG VICTORY, GREAT TASK (1968); E. 
GRUENING 8: H. BEASER, VIETNAM FOLLY (1968); w. Jusr, To WHAT END (1968); D. KRAS· 
LOW 8: S. LOORY, THE SECRET SEARCH FOR PEACE IN VIETNAM (1968); W. LEDERER, OUR 
OWN WORST ENEMY (1968); THE REALITIES OF VIETNAM (C. Beal ed. 1968); D. SCHOEN· 
DRUN, VIETNAM (1968); R. SHAPLEN, TIME OUT OF HAND (1969); SENATE COMM. ON 
FOREIGN RELAUONS, 90TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT BY SENATOR JOSEPH S. CLARK ON A 
STUDY MISSION TO SOUTH VIETNAM (Comm. Print 1968); VIETNAM: ISSUES AND ALTERNA· 
nvES (W. Isard ed. 1969); R. WHITE, NonODY WANTED WAR (1968); Fleming, Vietnam 
and After, 21 W. POL. Q. 141 (1968); Hannan, A Political Settlement for Vietnam: 
The 1951 Geneva Conference and Its Current Implications, 8 VA. J. INTL. L. 4 (1967); 
Kissinger, The Viet Nam Negotiations, 47 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 211 (1969); Murphy, Viet-
nam: A Study of Law and Politics, 36 FORDHAM L. REv. 453 (1968); Robertson, The 
Debate Among American International Lawyers About the Vietnam War, 46 TEXAS L. 
REv. 898 (1968); Schick, Some Reflections on the Legal Controversies Concerning 
America's Involvement in Vietnam, 17 INTL. 8: CoMP. L.Q. 953 (1968). 
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magnitude of the insurgency in South Vietnam; the nature, scope, 
and timing of Communist aggression from the North; and the ex-
tent of the representative character of the Saigon regimes. Perhaps 
equally significant is the widespread and indiscriminate use of 
rhetoric such as the "U.S. commitment in South Vietnam" and the 
"U.S. stake in Southeast Asia"-terms which comprise a hodge-
podge of goals, policies, and prescriptions. Other concepts, such 
as self-defense, aggression, and self-determination, are highly am-
biguous, and have successfuly defied any universally accepted def-
inition as to their content.2 Moreover, this vague terminology 
tends to obscure important facts. A combination of divergent views 
of the facts and excessive use of rhetoric is likely to result in con-
flicting and perhaps misleading interpretations and conclusions. Since 
the Vietnam conflict has evoked strong emotional responses in the 
United States, there is an immense risk that a writer's normative 
perspectives will inadvertently, or perhaps even knowingly, so in-
fluence his selection and interpretation of the facts and of the 
applicable legal principles as not only to hamper objective reporting, 
but also to stifle scholarly criticism and evaluation.3 Meanwhile, 
the growing mass of Vietnam literature has already reached the 
point at which the average person is inundated with divergent anal· 
yses of the war. He follows -events, if at all, by merely glancing 
through the labyrinth of daily news reports; indeed, he does that 
only as a result of a well-developed sense of duty. One of the first 
casualties of war is said to be truth, and the Vietnam situation is 
hardly an exception.4 
Nevertheless, several books and articles seem to stand out from 
the fog surrounding the Vietnam literature. Selected for review here 
are four such studies. They present the main political and legal argu-
2. See, e.g., D. BOWEIT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1958); I. BROWNLIE, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES (1963); R. EMERSON, SELF• 
DETERMINATION REVISITED IN THE ERA OF DECOLONIZATION (Harv. Univ. Center for Intl. 
Affairs, Occasional Papers in Intl. Affairs No. 9, Dec. 1964); H. JOHNSON, SELF-DETER-
:mNATION WlTHIN THE COMMUNITY OF NATIONS (1967); :M:. M®OUOAL &: F. FEUCIANO, 
LAW AND MINIMUM WoRLD PUBUO ORDER (1961): s. PossONY, AGGRESSION AND SELF· 
DEFENSE: THE LEGALITY OF U.S. ACTION IN SOUTH VIETNAM: (Univ. of Pa. Foreign Policy 
Research Institute, Monograph Series No. 6, 1966); J. STONE, AGGRESSION AND WoRLI) 
ORDER (1958); Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, 
23 U.N. GAOR, Agenda Item No. 86, U.N. Doc. A/7185/Rev. 1 (1968); Hazard, Why 
Try Again To Define Aggression?, 62 A11r. J. INTL. L. 701 (1968); Panel: Problems of Self-
Determination and Political Rights in the Developing Countries, 60 PROC. AM. SocY. 
INTL. L. 129-50 (1966). 
3. See, e.g., notes 56-60, 66-67 infra and accompanying text. 
4. U.N. Secretary General U Thant remarked at a press conference on February 24, 
1965: "I am sure the great American people, if only they knew the true facts and the 
background towards the development in South Vietnam, will agree with me that 
further bloodshed is ••• unnecessary ••• ," reprinted in LAWYERS COMM. ON 
AMERICAN Poucy TOWARDS VIETNAM, VIETNAM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 21 (1967). See 
generally D. KRASLO\V 8: s. LOORY, THE SECRET SEARCH FOR PEACE IN VIETNAM (1968); 
J. GOULDEN, TRUTH Is THE FIRST CASUALTY (1969). 
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ments that have been made with regard to the Vietnam. conflict and 
they elucidate the various approaches which have been taken in the 
continuing debate on Vietnam.5 No Afore Vietnams?,6 edited by 
Richard Pfeffer,7 is the product of a conference which took place 
in Chicago in the summer of 1968 under the auspices of the Adlai 
Stevenson Institute of International Affairs. The twenty-six con-
ferees included eminent scholars, current and former government 
officials, and journalists.8 In their dialogue, they present a candid 
evaluation of the causes that led to American involvement in Viet-
nam0-the national traits of the United States, the bureaucratic iner-
tia, and the misconceptions about Asia in general and about Vietnam 
in particular. In addition, they frankly inquire into the nature and 
suitability of the strategies used by the United States in the pros-
ecution of the war,1° and they appraise American foreign policy in 
view of the Vietnam. "fiasco."11 
The Vietnam War and International Law12 is a collection of 
articles and documents discussing legal aspects of the Vietnam. con-
flict; it was sponsored by the American Society of International Law, 
and was edited by Richard Falk,13 a distinguished international 
lawyer. The expressed views range from an unqualified defense 
of the legality of the United States role in Vietnam,14 to an equally 
vehement denunciation of the American position as illegal.15 
The Responsibilities of World Power16 and Beyond Vietnam11 
are two representative works by persons closely associated with the 
Washington scene. In the first, Senator Gale McGee18 presents an 
5. These studies were selected for review from scores of books the reviewer used in 
teaching a recent Jaw school course at the University of Denver entitled, "Legal and 
Political Issues in the Vietnam War." 
6. No MORE VIETNAMS? (R. Pfeffer ed. 1968) [hereinafter No MoRE VIETNAMs?]. 
7. Fellow of the Adlai Stevenson Institute and Research Fellow in Comparative Law 
at the University of Chicago Law School. 
8. Among the conferees were Henry Kissinger, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Hans 
Morgenthau, Stanley Hoffman, John McDermott, John King Fairbank, Theodore 
Draper, Edwin O. Reischauer, Samuel P. Huntington, James C. Thomson, Richard 
J. Barnet, Adam Yarmolinsky, and Sir Robert Thompson. 
9, No MORE VIETNAMS? 1-114. 
10. Id. at 115-88. 
11. Id. at 189-288. Stanley Hoffman and Edwin Reischauer both use the term 
"fiasco." Id. at 5 and 269 respectively. 
12. THE VIETNAM WAR A.ND INTERNATIONAL LAW (R. Falk ed. 1968) [hereinafter 
VIETNAM WAR]. 
Ill. Milbank Professor of International Law and Practices, Princeton University. 
14. See articles by John Moore, in VIETNAM WAR 237, 303, 401; Leonard Meeker, 
id. at !118; statement by Dean Rusk, id. at 335. 
15. See articles by Quincy Wright, id. at 271; Wolfgang Friedmann, id. at 292; 
Richard Falk, id. at 362, 445. 
16. G. McGEE, THE REsPONSIBlLITlES OF WORLD POWER (1968) [hereinafter McGEE]. 
17. E. R.EISCHA.UER, BEYOND VIETNAM (1967) [hereinafter RElsCHA.UERJ. 
18. United States Senator from Wyoming. 
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·articulate, although occasionally polemical, defense of the Johnson 
administration's policies in Vietnam. In the second, Professor Edwin 
Reischauer,19 an Asia specialist and a former United States Am-
bassador to Japan, clarifies the issues by presenting the Vietnam 
conflict in its broader Asian context. His contribution is particularly 
significant because he has been concerned with the problems exem-
plified by Vietnam for a longer period of time than have most com-
mentators. As early as 1955, he had warned of the danger in his 
book, Wanted: An Asian Policy: 
... Korea and China both reveal not simply distressing failures of 
American foreign policy, but frightening inadequacies in our whole 
approach. The United States has been less directly involved in Indo-
china, but the story has been essentially the same .... We have 
already tasted in these three countries the bitter fruits of ignorance 
and indifference, but Asia contains other potential Chinas, Koreas, 
and Indochinas, for which we are today no better prepared than 
we were for these earlier disasters .... 20 
Unfortunately, that warning was not heeded; and the book, unread, 
"sank quietly into the sea of library volumes without raising a 
ripple."21 
These four works focus upon five major issues of the Vietnam 
debate: (1) why and how the United States got involved in Vietnam; 
(2) what went wrong with American efforts there; (3) the legality 
of the United States role in the Vietnam conflict; (4) the lessons the 
United States can learn from the conflict-specifically, the effect it 
will have upon the American foreign policy of the future; and (5) 
the impact of the conflict on world order.22 These issues are clearly 
of major importance to the present and future foreign policy of the 
United States; each will be briefly examined in this Review, with 
emphasis on the views presented in the selected studies. 
19. Professor, Harvard University. United States -Ambassador to Japan, 1961-1966. 
20. Cited in R.EisCHAUER 36-37. 
21. Id. at 37. 
22. Major issues not discussed in these works pertain to the legality of the war 
under the United States Constitution, the limits of dissent to the war, the conduct 
of hostilities, and moral aspects. See, e.g., CLERGY AND LAYMEN CONCERNED AnoUT 
VIETNAM, IN THE NAME OF AMERICA (1968); F. WORMUTH, THE VIETNAM WAR: THE 
PRESIDENT VERSUS THE CONSTITUTION (Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 
Center Occasional Paper No: 3, April 1968); Faulkner, The War in Vietnam: Is It Con-
stitutional?, 56 GEo. L.J. 1132 (1968); Ferencz, War Crimes Law and the Vietnam War, 
17 AM. U. L. REv. 403 (1968); Finman & Macaulay, Freedom To Dissent: The Vietnam 
Protests and the Words of Public Officials, 1966 WIS. L. REv. 632; Guttman, Protest 
Against the Vietnam War, 382 ANNALS 56 (March 1969); Schwartz & McCormack, The 
Justiciability of Legal Objections to the American Military Effort in Vietnam, 46 TEXAS 
L. REv. 1033 (1968); Velvel, The War in Vietnam: Unconstitutional, Justiciable, and 
Jurisdictionally Attackable, 16 KAN. L. REv. 449 (1968). 
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I. THE UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN THE VIETNAM 
CONFLICT 
165 
There is a wide consensus in the Vietnam literature that the 
United States initial military involvement in Vietnam can be traced 
to Washington's overriding concern with containing an "aggressive" 
China, with saving Vietnam and adjoining states from falling as 
unwilling prey to "wars of national liberation," and with prevent-
ing the development of a situation in Asia which, according to the 
United States perception, might threaten its vital national inter-
ests. A clear example of this concern can be found in The Respon-
sibilities of World Power, in which Senator McGee stresses the 
need to contain the threat of Communist China. McGee, a former 
history professor, relies heavily on the history of Europe to supply 
guidelines "for American policy in shaping the new history of 
Asia."23 With analogies to the Nazi experience, he argues: "Little 
Vietnam and Thailand are just as important [to us] as were Austria 
and Poland in the 1930's. To abandon them would hold as grave a 
portent for the future as that of the 1930's."24 McGee holds the 
United States partly responsible for the devastation of Asia during 
World War II and for the subsequent "massive political vacuum" 
there,25 and he finds that American participation in the process of 
rebuilding Asia has been dictated by two factors-the continuing 
national interest of the United States, and a sense of moral obliga-
tion.26 He views the United States involvement in Vietnam as a 
logical corollary of the policy of containing China and depriving it 
of "the raw materials of Southeast Asia."27 That policy, he says, is 
based on the successful program of containing the Soviet Union in 
the post-World War II period.28 McGee contends that the reasons 
for American involvement in Vietnam can be found in the goal of 
"restoring a favorable balance of forces around the world."29 
Reischauer agrees that perhaps the dominant reason for the 
United States response was a perception in Washington of a Com-
munist threat in Southeast Asia. He disagrees, however, with the 
accuracy of that perception and consequently with the propriety 
23. McGEE 20. Although he cautions "against applying the experiences of Europe 
to the problems of Asia without careful reservations," he finds "common ingredients 
in the politics of both East and West." Id. at 19-20. 
24. Id. at 21. 
25. Id. at 17. 
26. Id. at 16-19, 49, 51. 
27. Id. at 23. See also id. at 22, 49, 226. 
28. Id. at 11, 12, 21, 22. 
29. Id. at 25. See also id. at 19. 
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of the United States response. American policy in Asia, he believes, 
was based on "hasty analogies drawn from other times and other 
places ... in the confused early posnvar years, or under the psycho-
logical Stresses of the cold war."30 In his opinion, such analogies 
between Asia and Europe, especially those which dictate an at-
tempt to contain communism by entering into bilateral defense 
treaties, are fundamentally false. 31 Thus, he strongly challenges 
McGee's contention that the United States presence in Vietnam re-
flects an appropriate response based on considerations of the balance 
of power in Asia. Indeed, Reischauer considers it "perhaps our great-
est mistake" to assume that the power balance in Asia was compa-
rable to that which existed in Europe.82 As distinguishing features, 
he recounts the Sino-Soviet rift, the costs to China or Russia of 
military conquest or political domination of the Asian lands, espe-
cially the burdens which would be placed on their economies if com-
munism were to spread in Asia, and the forces of nationalism on that 
continent. 33 
The remarks by a large majority of the conferees in No More 
Vietnams? are generally in agreement with Reischauer's position. 
They seek to expose the misconceptions underlying the United States 
Vietnam involvement. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., for example, ex-
plains the United States readiness to undertake intervention in Viet-
nam in terms of an historical framework comprised of two strains in 
American thinking about the United States role in the world-
the idea of collective security, and the concept of "liberal evange-
lism'; expressed through "a kind of global. New Dealism." He con-
cludes that that intervention "in the end, bore no relationship to 
any rational assessment of our interest."34 Adam Yarmolinsky holds 
three factors responsible for the United States decision to give as-
sistance to the Diem regime: anti-communist solidarity; concern 
about the Chinese domination of Southeast Asia; and fear that a 
shift in the loci of the iron and bamboo curtains would result if 
Communist military force were not met.36 James C. Thomson at-
tributes the early decisions about Vietnam to the legacy of the 
1950's-the "loss of China," the Korean War, and the Far East 
policy of Secretary Dulles which gave rise to the domino theory 
about Asia.36 Henry Kissinger focuses on "lack of historical know!-
30. R.ElsCHAUER 98. See also Reischauer in No MoRE VIETNAMS? 114. 
31. R.EiscHAuER 57-60. He admits, however, that "our efforts to give security to 
weak Asian states through SEATO and other alliances was [sic] well motivated and may 
have had some efficacy." Id. at 97. 
32. Id. at 92. 
33. Id. at 92-96. 
34. No MORE VIEl'NAMS? 7-8. 
35. Id. at 23. 
36. Id. at 20. 
The new Administration inherited and to some extent shared the "domino 
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edge": "[I]t is amazing that no one seems to have systematically 
studied, before we went there, what the French experience was in 
Vietnam .... [ and] why we thought we could achieve with sixteen 
thousand men what the French could not do with two hundred thou-
sand men."37 Theodore Draper places partial responsibility for 
intervention on "the doctrine of 'limited war' as it was worked 
out in the latter half of the 1950's outside the government and 
taken over by the government in the 1960's."38 Several others, in-
cluding Richard J. Barnet, discuss the impact of the failure of the 
American political and bureaucratic decision-making processes upon 
the United States initial involvement in Vietnam.39 
The thesis that concern with China led the United States to 
Vietnam is also supported by Quentin L. Quade, in The Vietnam 
War and International Law.40 Quade attempts a thorough anal-
ysis of American response to wars of national liberation, and finds 
that responsibility for the involvement in Vietnam lies in the 
United States perception of a future continuing struggle with 
China.41 
Thus, there is an apparent agreement among the political an-
alysts that the United States foresaw a direct threat from China or 
an indirect threat from the Southeast Asian activities of a world-
wide Communist conspiracy. That consensus, however, should not 
obscure the marked divergence of views as to the accuracy of that 
perception and as to the fitness of the United States response. 
II. THE UNITED STATES EFFORTS IN VIETNAM 
No More Vietnams? offers a brilliant analysis of the United 
States problems in Vietnam.42 Leading the discussion, Stanley Hoff-
man identifies as the United States hubris, its "old 'illusion of 
omnipotence.' "43 He believes that this illusion, coupled with the 
United States misreading of reality and its ignorance of the context, 
has resulted in the present morass. It has led, for example, to the 
theory" about Asia. This theory resulted from profound ignorance of Asian history 
and hence ignorance of the radical differences among Asian nations and societies. 
It resulted from a blindness to the power and resilience of Asian nationalisms. 
(It may also have resulted from a subconscious sense that since "all Asians look 
alike,'' all Asian nations will act alike.) As a theory, the domino fallacy was not 
merely inaccurate but also insulting to Asian nations; yet it has continued to this 
day to beguile men who should know better. 
Id. at 21. 
37. Id. at 13. 
38. Id. at 26. 
39. See Barnet, id. at 50-74, 90-96; Thomson, id. at 44-50; Wohlstetter, id. at 74-83; 
Yarmolinsky, id. at 102-08. 
40. VIETNAM WAR 102. 
41. Id. at 110. 
42. No MoRE VIETNAMS? 115-88. 
43. Id. at 121. 
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deployment of massive conventional war machinery to cope with an 
insurgency situation, and it has encouraged efforts to build "some-
one else's nation, to [create] a stable society and polity elsewhere, 
in the midst of a large-scale war."44 That same hubris, moreover, 
has caused an Americanization of the war, thereby providing the 
insurgents with a cause, and has "brought not merely physical but 
social destruction to the people we came to protect."45 Sir Robert 
Thompson, who guided the successful campaign against guerrillas 
in Malaya, concurs in part: "The wrong definition of the original 
threat (the Korea complex) and the building of too large and con-
ventional an army to meet it, were the beginning of the tragedy."46 
But Thompson offers a remedy for similar situations in the future. 
His over-all strategy for a Vietnam-type intervention would be to 
assign a top priority to the task of nation building and then to 
follow that with pacification and, finally, with destruction of the 
enemy forces. He considers the major weakness of the United States 
strategy to be a reversal of priorities.47 In addition, he finds that 
the current situation lacks the basic prerequisites for a successful 
prosecution of the intervention strategy-effective organizational 
machinery and the control necessary to implement the strategy. 
Thus, he places a large part of the blame for the failure of the 
United States policy on administrative problems-specifically, on 
the lack of a good working relationship between the United States 
and the government of South Vietnam, and on the latter's incom-
petence in governing.48 As a solution to the latter problem, he 
recommends an effort by the United States to strengthen the admin-
istrative capabilities of the host country's government by training, 
policing, improving communications and intelligence systems, in-
troducing an equitable taxation system, and developing an economic 
assistance program. 
Taking issue with Thompson, John McDermott argues that the 
existing social and political conditions in Vietnam were such that 
success was not possible for the American strategy under any cir-
cumstances. It is McDermott's position that even if Thompson's 
prescription for strengthening the governing capacity in the host 
country had been faithfully implemented in South Vietnam, the 
United States aim of nation-building in that country would still 
have failed.49 
44. Id. at 130. 
45. Id. at 134. See also s. HOFFMAN, GULLIVER'S TROUBLES 176-213 (1965). 
46. No MoRE V.lfil'NAMs? 156. See id. at 154-71 for all of Thompson's arguments. 
47. Id. at 157-58. 
48. Id. at 158-62. 
49. Id. at 171-79. See also id. at 244-45. 
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In The Responsibilities of World Power, Senator McGee blames 
the setbacks to the Vietnam policy on the United States failure to 
react quickly to meet Hanoi's military escalation in 1963 and 1964. 
In his opinion, the United States miscalculations, "mistakes, if you 
prefer,"110 were errors in timing and in shifting tactics. Such errors, 
he feels, were made by responding directly to the guerrilla warfare, 
by failing to recognize the importance of local security forces, and 
by asking in 1965, "How many troops will it take not to lose in 
the south?" when the question should have been, "How many 
troops will be needed to win?"51 Thus, he identifies the United 
States mistakes in tactical terms.52 To that kind of analysis, William 
R. Polk responds in No Afore Vietnams?: 
It seems to me that as a rough rule of thumb one can say that some-
thing like 80 per cent of the process of guerrilla warfare is political, 
15 per cent administrative, and only 5 per cent military. Applying 
this scale to the Vietnamese conflict, one can say that the political 
issue was largely decided as early as 1946, and the administrative issue 
by about 1957, and that we are talking today only about the residual 
5 per cent.53 
This dialogue enhances one's awareness and appreciation of 
the complicated nature of the problem, and is likely to stimulate 
further inquiry into important questions concerning the order of 
priorities for an intervening nation, the proper role of a foreign 
power in "nation-building," and the purpose of foreign aid. In ad-
dition, it raises the problem whether the policy of incrementalism 
is as unfit to meet guerrilla warfare as is the policy of massive re-
taliation, especially when the insurgency is substantially indigenous. 
Finally, the difference of opinion over the United States strategy 
in Vietnam demonstrates the vital need that the total strategy and 
tactics of the intervening state be coordinated to conform to its 
overriding policy objective. To do this, the intervening nation must 
insure itself built-in flexibility, so that it has several options avail-
able at any given stage of the conflict, thus avoiding the situation 
in which strategy begins to dictate policy and to drag policy-makers 
into unforeseen traps. The method for creating this necessary flex-
ibility, however, is not readily apparent. 
III. LEGAL AsPECTS OF THE CONFLICT 
What greets a reader at the threshold of examining the legality 
of the United States activities in Vietnam is a state of utter con-
50, McGEE 251. 
51. Id. at 249 (emphasis deleted). 
52. Id. at 239-55. 
53. No MoRE VIEI'NAMS? 184. 
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fusion. This derives, at least in part, from the inability of the tra-
ditioll-al concepts of international law54 to provide a framework 
within which a Vie,t:n.am-like sitqation can be identified, discussed, 
and resolved. Another, and equally formidable, handicap which is 
partially responsible for this undesirable situation is the lack of an 
impartial fact-finding apparatus in the international arena. More-
over, the United Nations Charter and various other international 
agreements, including the 1954 Geneva Accords, are susceptible of 
varying interpretations. That factor, combined with the decentral-
ized nature of the world community and the weaknesses which 
attend its ideological orientation, relegates juridical considerations 
to a secondary position. Law is still relevant, it can be argued; but 
in view of the power-oriented, ideological structure of the inter-
national society, other considerations, mainly political and eco• 
nomic, must dictate policies.55 Thus, it should come as no surprise 
that the ranks of international lawyers are deeply split on the issue 
of the legality of the United States actions in Vietnam. Their 
writings show that they are polarized into clashing positions-either 
as staunch defenders or as equally staunch critics of the United 
States role in Vietnam. 
This polarization can easily be seen by comparing The Legality 
of United States Participation in the Defense of Vietnam,156 a memo-
randum from the Legal Advisor of the United States Department 
of State, with the major criticism of that work. The memorandum 
altogether ignores the legal arguments that might weaken the as-
sertion that the United States is lawfully in Vietnam and confines 
its discussion to the selection and interpretation of facts and law 
most favorable to the American position. Thus, it seems to have 
invited the comment that it is merely an exercise in rationalizing 
and justifying an existing government position, and therefore does 
not qualify as an objective legal assessment of the situation. 57 How-
ever, the major study criticising the memorandum on that score, 
Vietnam and International Law,r;s itself suffers from a similar ad-
54. See, e.g., w. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 745-51 (reprisals), 751-54 (interven-
tion), 776-79 (self-defense), 274 (self-determination) (2d ed. 1962). 
55. See, e.g., Wright, Legal Aspects of the Viet-Nam Situation, 60 AM. J. INTL. L. 
750, 769 (1966), in VIETNAM WAR 271, 290. 
56. The Memorandum of March 4, 1966, is reprinted in 112 CoNG. REc. 5504 (1966), 
60 AM. J. INTL. L. 565 (1966), and VIETNAM WAR 583. An earlier U.S. Department of 
State Memorandum of March 8, 1965, Legal Basis for United States Actions Against 
North Viet-Nam, was reprinted in STAFF OF SENATE CoM?.r. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 89TH 
CONG., 2o SESS., BACKGROUND INFORMATION RELATING TO SOUTHEAST AsIA AND VIETNAM 
199 (Comm. Print 2d rev. ed. 1966). 
57. See Falk, Preface to LAWYERS COMM. ON .AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS VIET-
NAM, VlETNAM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 13 (1967). 
58. LAWYERS COMM. ON AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS VIETNAM, VIETNAM AND IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW (1967). See also LAWYERS COMM. ON AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS 
VlETNAM, AMERICAN PoucY VIS-A-VIS VIETNAM, MEMORANDUM OF LAW, reproduced in 
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versary perspective. Indeed, its fact selection process and its argu-
ments give it the appearance of a prosecutor's brief. But those are not 
the only one-sided works. Other studies, notably Law and Vietnam,159 
and The Lawfulness of United States Assistance to the Republic 
of Viet Nam, 60 also appear to be stout efforts at providing an all-out 
defense for the United States position, and are therefore unreliable 
appraisals. 
The Vietnam War and International Law offers a stimulating 
discussion among American international lawyers, even though the 
conceptual framework is mainly based on untrustworthy61 tradi-
tional doctrines. In Part I, 62 articles by numerous professors63 and 
excerpts from Emmerich de Vattel and John Stuart Mill deal with 
the broad issues of internal conflict and intervention, thus provid-
ing an ideal setting for Parts II and III, which contain inquiries into 
the legal issues of the Vietnam War. 64 Those inquiries are then 
made in selections from Eliot Hawkins, from Leonard Meeker, for-
merly the Legal Advisor to the United States Department of State, 
and from many noted professors of international law.65 
The legal arguments which appear in these studies have a wide 
range, but all are based on the same set of customary international 
law norms. Those norms pertain to aggression, self-defense, the gen-
eral treaty law respecting the breach of agreements, the require-
ments of necessity and proportionality in the use of force, and the 
requirements for statehood. Also invoked occasionally are the United 
Nations Charter, the 1954 Geneva Accords, and the SEATO Treaty. 
Despite their reliance on the same general principles, however, the 
international lawyers come to conflicting conclusions. That conflict 
may be traced to their disagreement on issues of mixed fact and 
112 CONG. REC. 2666 (1966); Declaration of World Conference of Lawyers for Vietnam, 
Grenoble, July 6-10, 1968. 
59. R. HULL &: J. NovooRAD, LAW AND VIETNAM (1968). 
60. Moore &: Underwood, The Lawfulness of United States Assistance to the Republic 
of Viet Nam, 5 DUQUESNE U. L. R.Ev. 235 (1967) (in collaboration with Myres McDougal), 
reprinted in 112 CoNG. REc. 15,519 (1966). See also Deutsch, Legality of the War in 
Vietnam, 7 WASHBURN L.J. 153 (1968). 
61. See note 54 supra and accompanying text. 
62. VIETNAM WAR 17-159. 
63. Those professors are Manfred Halpern, Professor of Politics, Princeton Uni-
versity; William T. Burke, Professor of Law, Ohio State University; Quentin L. Quade, 
Professor of Political Science, Marquette University; ,valt ,v. Rostow, Professor of 
Economics and History, University of Texas, former Special Assistant to the President; 
and Wolfgang Friedmann, Professor of Law, Columbia University. 
61. See VIETNAM WAR 163-522. 
65. These are Quincy Wright, Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Chicago; 
Wolfgang Friedmann; Richard A. Falk; John N. Moore, Associate Professor of Law, 
University of Virginia; Daniel G. Parton, Professor of Law, Boston University; Neill 
H. Alford, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Virginia; and Tom J. Farer, Assistant 
Professor of Law, Columbia University. 
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law. The most important of these issues is whether Vietnam is a po-
litical entity; that is, whether it qualifies as a separate state, and if it 
does, on what date it achieved that status. One's feeling about this 
matter has some effect on his position as to whether the conflict is a 
civil war, an international conflict, or both. I£ it is thought to com-
bine elements of both, there is further disagreement about whether 
the conflict was originally indigenous, or whether it was of extrane-
ous instigation, assistance, and control; and about the time and 
source of the military assistance received by both the incumbents 
and the insurgents. The lawyers also differ about the kind of re-
prisals still permissible under international law. Since the United 
States collective self-defense measures are claimed to have been 
undertaken in response to the alleged armed attack from the North, 
one's stand on the validity of those measures depends upon whether, 
in his belief, the North Vietnamese actions of infiltration and sub-
version constituted armed attack as defined in the United Nations 
Charter. A final area of disagreement concerns the basis of the 1954 
Geneva Accords, who is bound by them, and how they should be 
interpreted, particularly with respect to the election provision. A 
determination of those factors is important, for one's opinion as to 
who has violated the Geneva Accords-North Vietnam, South Viet-
nam, or the United States-has a significant impact upon his position 
as to the legality of the subsequent conduct of each participant. 
Perhaps, as Professor Friedmann contends in The Vietnam War 
and International Law, disagreement stems in part from the ten-
dency to use international law "as part of the armory of national 
policy,"66 and to interpret its norms "so as to conform, in all cases, 
with national policy."67 But it may also reflect a genuine difference 
of opinion among reasonable men, based upon scholarly analyses 
of the legal issues. 68 
In view of the imperfect nature of international law, an impar-
tial determination of these issues is, at present, neither feasible nor 
practicable. Nevertheless, there are four major subjects in urgent 
need of further inquiry: (1) the problem of fact-finding in a Vietnam-
type conflict;69 (2) the determination of statehood under international 
law;70 (3) the interpretation of international agreements;71 and (4) 
66. VIEI'NAM WAR 294. 
67. Id. 
68. See Moore, id. at 315. 
69. See G.A. Res. 2104, U.N. GAOR Supp. 14, at 92, 20 U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966). 
For a recent article discussing this problem, see Franclc & Cherkis, The Problem of 
Fact-Finding in International Disputes, 18 W. REs. L. REv. 1483 (1967). 
70. For a recent inquiry, see Comment, Recognition in International Law: A Func-
tional Reappraisal, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 857 (1967). 
71. M. McDOUGAL, H. LAsswELL & J. :MILLER, INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND 
WoRLD Punuc ORDER (1967) raises and discusses major issues in interpreting agreements. 
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the problem of establishing a set of operative norms, or at least 
some policy guidelines, to deal with insurgency situations in which 
external participation of varying degrees has already taken place.72 
The last of these problems is in particular need of examination and, 
if possible, resolution. The customary international law doctrines 
of intervention and nonintervention are so vague and so susceptible 
of subjective invocation and interpretation that they offer no useful 
guidelines in the present context.73 Thus, other standards and solu-
tions must be sought. A distinction might be made, for example, 
between the prohibition of military tactical support on the one 
hand, and the legitimation of diplomatic, ideological, and economic 
strategies on the other.74 In addition, it might be useful to create 
typologies of internal conflict, using external involvement and the 
indigenous nature of the conflict to determine legal rights and duties 
of other parties.71:i 
IV. THE LESSONS OF THE VIETNAM CONFLICT 
No matter what the eventual outcome of the Paris peace talks, 
it is hoped that one salutary effect of the Vietnam conflict will be a 
reassessment of the United States foreign policy in general, and of its 
policy toward Asia in particular. A re-evaluation of the United States 
capabilities and weaknesses in the context of insurgencies should be 
another natural consequence of the protracted Vietnam conflict. 
Through this reappraisal, the country should examine means of 
avoiding future actions leading to undesirable military interven-
tions, while resisting the temptation to lapse into neo-isolationism 
as a reaction to a revulsion against the Vietnam experience.76 Assum-
ing that it is possible to achieve both goals, the government should 
then determine what guidelines American policymakers must follow 
72. The literature on internal conflicts is growing rapidly. For selected recent writing, 
see R. BARNET, supra note l; A. CAMPBELL, GUERRILLAS (1968); R. COTTAM, COMPETlTIVE 
INTERFERENCE AND TWENTIETH CENTURY DIPLOMACY (1967); THE DIRTY WARS (D. Robin-
son &: S. Marshall eds. 1968); INTERNATIONAL AsPECTS OF CIVIL STRIFE 0• Rosenau ed. 
1964); R. McCUNTOCK, THE MEANING OF LIMITED WAR (1967); L. MILLER, WORLD ORDER 
AND LOCAL DISORDER (1967); C. 1\11.'DANS &: S. 1\1'1.'DANS, THE VIOLENT PEACE (1968); J. 
PAGET, COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS (1967); POUTICS OF VIOLENCE (C. Leiden &: 
K. Schmitt eds. 1968); R. THOMPSON, DEFEATING COMMUNIST INSURGENCY, STUDIES IN 
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY No. 10 (1966). 
73. See Burke, VIETNAM WAR 79; Falk, id. at 362, 445; Farer, id. at 509. 
74. For elaborate discussion on such a proposal, sec Farer, Harnessing Rogue Ele-
phants: A Short Discourse on Foreign Intervention in Civil Strife, 82 HARv. L. REv. 
!HI (1969). 
75. VIETNAM WAR 6-7 suggests this and other possibilities. 
76. For expressions of serious concern on this point, sec No MoRE VIETNAMS? 
207 (Pool); id. at 216 (Hoffman); id. at 218 (Huntington); id. at 260-61 (Thomson); 
id. at 268-70, 283 (Reischauer); id. at 273 (Thompson); McGEE ix; RE!sCHAUER 14-15, 
41-42, 99. 
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in directing the United States toward a restrained but effective role 
of leadership and responsibility in world affairs. 77 
The studies under review offer a wide range of prescriptions. 
Samuel P. Huntington, for instance, recommends a program of pre-
ventive political ihvolvement.78 Under that program, the purpose 
of the United States involvement in a nation displaying a potentially 
explosive situation would be to promote political development by 
helping the nation to build institutions which are broadly based, 
tightly structured, and therefore "capable of channelling discontent 
into peaceful paths."79 He prefers political involvement both to 
socio-economic development and to ultimate military intervention, 
because political involvement, by its very nature, could "well be 
more discreet, less expensive, and more productive of political sta-
bility.''80 Huntington also presents practical suggestions as to policies 
which the United States could follow to foster political develop-
ment.81 His basic assumption is that the overriding benefits of the 
United States involvement should be the deterrence of overt aggres-
sions and the prevention of domestic insurrections which would 
othenvise threaten vital American interests. 
Others take issue with Huntington's "essentially technical view 
of political development,"82 "welfare imperialism,"83 "culture-cen-
tered optimism,"84 and "social [and] political engineering;"85 and 
they view with skepticism the feasibility or desirability of the United 
States assuming such a role. But a wide consensus seems to emerge 
on several points: the United States should critically re-examine 
the limits of its power to shape the world according to its wishes;86 
it should more carefully establish the meaning and priorities of 
its national interest;81 it should distinguish between different types 
of intervention;88 and it should rigorously study any situation be-
fore becoming involved in it.89 There is also general agreement that 
the United States should adopt a "lower posture in world affairs."00 
77. See No MORE VIETNAMs? 207-08, 214 (Pool); id. at 262-65 (Thomson); id. at 270-71 
(Reischauer). See also Reston, Washington: The Turning of the Tide, N.Y. Times, 
Aug. 6, 1969, at 32, col. 3. 
78. See No MORE VIETNAMS? 217-32. 
79. Id. at 225. See also id. at 278-80, 284. 
80. 1d. at 232. 
81. Id. at 231. 
82. Id. at 237. See id. at 232-58. 
83. Id. at 232. See also id. at 256-57. 
84. Id. at 237. 
85. Id. at 247, 251. 
86. See; e.g., id. at 197-98 (Hoffman), 268 (Reischauer). 
87. See, e.g., id. at 198 (Hoffman), 263 (Thomson), 278 (Cooper). 
88. See, e.g., id. at 196 (Hoffman), 264 (Thomson). 
89. See, e.g., id. at 193-94 (Hoffman), 263-64 (Thomson), 278 (Cooper). 
90. Id. at 261 (Thomson). 
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Such a posture would not negate coJ;J.cern with the rest of the world 
but would indicate a cautious approach to crises, a policy of dise!l--
gagement and deactivism,91 and a preference for exploring alterna-
tive multilateral measures to meet crises.9ll 
On the other hand, there is a great divergence of views among 
the commentators as to the United States role in the specific Asian 
context. Senator McGee urges that the country persist in "holding a 
firm line" and " 'staying the course' in [Southeast] Asia,"93 while 
Edwin Reischauer prescribes a gradual withdrawal as the most de-
sirable course of action,94 and Hans Morgenthau recommends that 
the United States policy "ought to be neither piecemeal military 
intervention on the mainland nor disengagement altogether."95 
Reischauer provides the most thorough analysis of the Asian polit-
ical and economic situation,96 and offers a diagnosis that in Asia 
"nationalism is the basic driving force and Communism the tech-
nique sometimes adopted to fulfill it."97 Thus, in his opinion, com-
munism is but one of nationalism's vehicles. Reischauer does not 
consider it likely that communism in any form-whether as a global 
movement, as Chinese neo-imperialism, o.r as a series of independent 
Communist movements-could establish even a temporary hold 
over the greater part of non-Communist Asia.98 But even if all of 
Asia were to become Communist-dominated, he feels, there would 
be no threat to the United States security.99 He finds that the Com-
munist movements in Asia have thrived primarily on local discon-
tent and that the proper response is as much economic and political 
as military. His analysis of the Asian situation leads him to observe 
that "our great military power is relatively ineffective in the area."100 
Reischauer suggests a long-range, constructive approach to Asia's 
problems instead of a short-range, defensive one. As a first step in 
his approach, the United States should come to know and under-
stand Asia better: "In approaching Asia, we are like the proverbial 
blind men examining the elephant. "101 He feels that if the country 
91. See id. at 261-67 (Thomson), 268-70, 283 (Reischauer), 273 (Thompson). See also 
id. at 232-43 (Ahm2d). 
92. See, e.g., id. at 262-66 (Thomson), 271 (Reischauer). But see id. at 285-87 
(Wohlstetter). 
93. McGEE 269. See id. at 256-69. For his eight concrete suggestions, see id. at 260-67. 
McGee's analysis of the Asian political scene and his perception of the American 
national interest in Asia seem to suffer from over-generalizations. 
94. See RE!SCHAUER 208-12. 
95. No MoRE VIETNAM$? 277. See also H. MoRGENTHAU, A NEW FOREIGN PoLlCY FOR 
nm UNITED STATES 129-56, 189-206 (1969), 
96. RE!sCHAUER 45-99, 
97. Id. at 64. 
98. Id. at 92-95. 
99. Id. at 95-96. 
100. Id. at 84. 
101. Id. at 45. 
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is to avoid future Vietnam quagmires, and if it is to develop the ca-
pability to respond adequately to similar situations if they do occur, 
it must identify the basic problems in Asia and must rethink 
broader Asian policy;102 only then, in his opinion, can the United 
States make wiser choices. Reischauer then offers many concrete 
proposals for improving the United States relations, particularly 
with Japan103 and China,104 but also for its dealings with the rest 
Of Asia,lOIS 
V. IMPACT ON WORLD ORDER 
The already fragile world order is likely to be further weakened 
if no viable means can be found to regulate the use of force in the 
international arena. Promoting and strengthening modalities which 
are nonviolent and primarily diplomatic, and encouraging states to 
employ those modalities in the pursuit of their national interests 
is an imperative of first priority. Yet when a scene of internal con-
flict becomes a focal point of conflicting ideologies and the conflict 
assumes the nature of a holy war,106 the use of force is often justified 
--or rationalized-as a commitment to human dignity,107 a neces-
sary evil to ensure genuine self-determination of peoples,1°8 a fight 
102. See id. at 32-42. 
103. See id. at 105-39. 
104. See id. at 140-80. 
105. See id. at 181-212. 
106. See U Thant's statement in VDITNAM WAR 344. 
107. Murphy, Vietnam: A Study of Law and Politics, 36 FORDHAM L. REv. 453 
(1968). 
Professor Falk makes much of the belief that if national elections were held in the 
fifties, Ho Chi Minh probably would have been victorious. Yet if victorious, ••• 
widespread terror and executions 'in the North during 1955-1956 would very 
probably have been repeated throughout the country. Could such actions pass 
muster before the conscience of mankind? Surely, at some point, the exigencies of 
Mandst history must come under some objective evaluation. Wherein lies the 
essential relationship between the person and the state? Does existence have 
meaning outside the demands of collective life? What judicial protection against 
the state does a commitment to human dignity require? These are not academic 
considerations, they bear directly upon the truly human dimensions• of the Viet-
nam tragedy. [Footnotes omitted.] 
Id. at 459. 
108. See, e.g., Ambassador Goldberg's statement made at the Plenary Session of the 
United Nations General Assembly on September 22, 1966: "We seek to assure for the 
people of South Vietnam the same right of self-determination-to decide its own 
political destiny, free of force-that the United Nations Charter affirms for all." Cited 
in Deutsch, Legality of the War in Viet Nam, 7 WASHBURN L.J. 153, 160 (1968). 
President Johnson's statement, cited by Dean Rusk in VIETNAM WAR 340, is to the 
same effect: "(I]f [the North Vietnamese] aggression is stopped, the people and govern-
ment of South Vietnam will be free to settle their own future, and the need for 
supporting American military action there will end." Addressing the twentieth an-
niversary of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers in Paris on Jan. 20, 
1967, I.I. Karpets, Director of the Moscow Institute of Criminology said: "The first 
[important task of the association] is to rally all progressive forces to the defense of 
the Vietnamese people, who alone are entitled to decide the fate of their country." 
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for democracy109 and freedom,110 or a war of national liberation.111 
The following remarks by former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, 
intended to scold international lawyers for their "arrogance" in 
trying to analyze in legal terms the 1962 Cuban Quarantine, illus-
trate that kind of attitude: 
I must conclude that the propriety of the Cuban quarantine is not a 
legal issue. The power, position and prestige of the United States 
had been challenged by another state; and law simply does not deal 
with such questions of ultimate power-power that comes close to 
the sources of sovereignty .... The survival of states is not a matter 
of law.112 
Highlighted by this line of reasoning is the crucial issue of the 
Vietnam conflict: how can and should the use of force be controlled 
in international relations, especially in a situation involving insur-
gency? When that issue is particularized in the context of the United 
States role in Vietnam, the significant question is whether the United 
States actions violate international law, or whether they are justi-
fied and thereby create a precedent for intervention by a major 
power in a small nation tom by internal conflict, especially if the 
conflict is aided and inspired by external sources. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Sometime in the future, military historians, political analysts, 
and international lawyers might answer a crucial question about the 
present conflict: even assuming that the United States aim was to 
establish a free and independent Vietnam and thereby to make pos-
sible a stable Vietnamese society capable of resisting attempted sub-
version and aggression,113 was that goal attainable at its outset? In 
other words, was victory impossible because of the very nature of the 
INTERNATIONAL AsSOCIATION OF DEMOCRATIC LAWYERS, XXTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE 
I.A.D.L.: A REPORT .ABOUT THE CoMMEMORATIVE MEETING AT UNESCO HOUSE 24 (Paris: 
Jan. 20, 1967). 
109. But U Thant stated: "In Vietnam there is growing evidence that the so-called 
'fight for democracy' is no longer relevant to the realities of the situation." U Thant's 
statement in VIETNAM WAR 247. 
110. "The American policy of assisting South Viet-Nam to maintain its freedom 
was inaugurated under President Eisenhower and continued under Presidents Kennedy 
and Johnson." Dean Rusk's statement in id. at 340. 
111. See, e.g., id. at 339 for the following statement by Dean Rusk: "Viet-Nam 
presents a clear current case of the lawful versus the unlawful use of force. I would 
agree with General Giap and other Communists that it is a test case for 'wars of 
national liberation.' ,ve intend to meet that test." 
112. Remarks by the Honorable Dean Acheson, 57 PRoc. AM. Socy. INTL. L. 13, 14 
(1963). See also Remarks by the Honorable Dean Acheson, The Arrogance of Interna-
tional Lawyers, 2 INTL. I.Aw. 591 (1968). 
!Ill. See Sir Rohen Thompson's remarks in No MoRE VIETNAMS? 156-57. 
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conflict,114 or did the United Stat.es fail as a result of faulty strategy, 
ill timing, the adoption of ''a mini-brute force policy,"m or ~dminis• 
trative and bureaucratic weaknesses?116 The proximity of events 
might preclude an authoritative, conclusive determination of this 
question at the present time. However, one can gain from the cur-
rent debate a recognition of the complexity of this multi-faceted prob-
lem, and an appreciation of the genuine difference of opinion as to 
the reasons for, and priorities of, such interventions. It is encourag-
ing that one can discern in the midst of this morass a willingness 
to examine the reasons for the attitudes and events that have shaped 
the United States Vietnam policy, and the open-mindedness which 
is imperative for pursuing further inquiry into such muddled areas 
of law and policy. 
Nevertheless, although the inquisitive, scholarly approach in 
analyzing such a highly emotional issue as the Vietnam war is 
noticeable in the works of several contemporary writers, a critical 
appraisal of the Vietnam literature still shows that there are two 
urgent needs. The first is to intensify scholarly efforts toward pro-
moting the regulation of force in international relations, and, at the 
same time, to explore mechanisms-both old and new-for pro-
viding substitutes for the use of force which do not sacrifice effective-
ness in the pursuit of national interests. The second need is to 
continue the search for clarifying and refining the international law 
norms pertaining to the rights and duties of third parties in internal-
conflii;:t situatiqns. 
A look at the Vietnam literature also identifies a glaring gap in 
present thinking. That gap is the lack of any significant dialogue 
among international lawyers, scholars in political science and 
international relations, and policymakers in Washington. The in-
difference toward international legal norms-"the niceties of inter-
national law"-often demonstrated by political scientists who rely 
mainly, if not exclusively, upon naked concepts of power and vital 
state interests in fomrulating and prescribing national policies,117 
works only to frustrate their efforts to build a viable world order. 
Equally tenuous are the pretensions of some international lawyers 
who surround themselves with a self-created halo of purely juridical 
norms. If they pursue their laudable objectives of resolving inter-
state or intrastate confrontations-which are often highly explosive, 
mainly political, and ideologically oriented-without regard to other 
fI4, See F • .ARMBRUSTER, R. GASTIL, H. KAHN, w. PFAFF &: E. SllLLMAN, CAN WE 
WIN 1~ VIETNAM? (Hudson mstitute Series on National Security and International 
Order No. 2, 1968). 
ll5. No MORE VIETNAMS? 14Q. See id. at 138-41, 201-02. 
ll6. See note 39 supra and accompanying text, 
ll7. For a recent formulation by a leading exponent of this thought, see H. 
MORGENTHAU, A NEW FOREIGN POUCY FOR THE UNITED STAn:8 111-56, 241-44 (1969). 
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disciplines or to pertinent conditioning factors and interactions, 
they are doomed to failure. 
International law does not operate in a vacuum, and it is not, at 
least at present, a panacea for all the ills of the international com-
munity. Nonetheless, it has a proper role in providing a framework 
of inquiry to clarify goals, policies, strategies, outcomes, and long-
range effects.118 Without the interaction between international law 
and political science,119 the analysis of a Vietnam-type situation 
tends to be sketchy, lopsided, and inadequate. 
Ved P. Nanda, 
Associate Professor of Law, 
University of Denver 
ll8. For a thought-provoking statement on the role of international law in the 
contemporary world, see McDougal, Perspectives for an International Law of Human 
Dignity, 58 PRoc. AM:. SocY. INTI.. L. 107 (1959). 
119. For expressions of this concern, see Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the 
Supreme Court: Some Intersections Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. R.Ev. 
169 (1968); Polsby, On Intersections Between Law and Political Science, 21 STAN. L. 
REV. 142 (1968). 
